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ARGUMENT 
Failure to disclose -
Defendant Mutual Protective Insurance Company (MPIC) 
asserts: 
It is undisputed that in the application Mrs. Seymour failed 
to disclose her significant medical history of progressive mental 
impairment and mental confusion and her diagnosis of probable 
organic brain syndrome, including her hospitalization for memory 
impairment in 1985. Mrs. Seymour also failed to disclose that 
she was hospitalized again in 1988 for chest pain .... 
(Appellee's Brief, at 7). 
In fact, Mrs. Seymour did disclose in the application the 
fact that she suffered from high blood pressure (Record, at 28, 
No. 3; Appellant's Brief, Addendum 3, No. 3), which was the 
basis, according to the affidavit of her doctor, for the 
hospitalization in 1985 with respect to memory impairment. 
(Record, at 116). The condition of high blood pressure may also 
have been the underlying reason, at least from her point of view, 
for the hospitalization for chest pain in 1988. 
The question in the application concerning hospitalization 
only inquired concerning confinement for conditions other than 
those for which response had already been given in previous 
questions. (Record, at 28, No. 5; Appellant's Brief, Addendum 3, 
No. 5). Mrs. Seymour had answered, in Application Question 3, 
that she had high blood pressure, for which she had been 
hospitalized, and thereby, with that response, included the 
answer to the hospitalization inquiry of Application Question 5. 
The information she provided was in accordance with the opinion 
of her doctor, at least until the final diagnosis, of which she 
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was unaware. (Record, at 116). In other words, Mrs. Seymour did 
not "fail to disclose" her medical history to the insurer. She 
did disclose her history, based on her own knowledge of her 
condition, which is all that the insurer and its agent asked of 
her in the application process. (Record, at 29, No. 10; 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum 3, No. 10). 
The phrase "failed to disclose" (Appellee's Brief, at 7) 
could be interpreted to mean simply the failure to include and 
transmit all of the information that the insurance underwriter 
would have liked to have received for the evaluation of the risk, 
To this allegation, Mrs. Seymour might have responded that she 
answered the insurer's questions truthfully. If desired 
information was missing, it was the fault of the insurer and its 
agent. It was not her responsibility to divine the true intent 
of the drafter of the contract or the desires of the insurance 
underwriters. If they had wanted more specific information, they 
could have asked more specific questions. 
However, the phrase "failed to disclose" (Appellee's Brief, 
at 7) could also be interpreted to mean that Mrs. Seymour 
intentionally and deliberately withheld information, lying to the 
company and its agent to induce the issuance of the insurance 
policy. This, of course, the Plaintiff categorically denies, and 
MPIC has no evidence to support such a contention or implication. 
An inference of this type of conduct on the part of Mrs. Seymour 
must not be drawn in this case. However, Mr. Derbidge suggests 
that it would be just such malevolent behavior for which the 
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statute in question (U.C.A. 31A-21-105) was intended, for the 
very purpose of allowing rescission of contract to protect the 
insurer in such a case. 
Redundancy of st .* t 11» r»i y f»11 > v j s i < 11»•« -
Mr. Derbidge contends that U.C.A. 31A-21-105 affords the 
escape of rescission to the insurer only for cases of 
"misrepresentation," defined in Utah as knowledgeable 
misstatement of fact. (Appellant's Brief, at 13-15). On the 
basis of such misrepresentation, the insurer may then rescind if: 
it has relied on the error which is either material or made with 
intent to deceive, or the error has contributed to the loss. 
(Appellant's Brief, at 14; Addendum 1 ) . MPIC suggests that this 
position is "untenable," (Appellee"s Brief, at 8) as the 
interpretation would include the requirement of knowledge of the 
applicant twice, first at the initial definition of 
misrepresentation, and secondly at the option, or "prong" of 
"intent to deceive". The statutory language of "intent to 
deceive", it is further suggested, would therefore be rendered 
"redundant," meaningless, and not in accord with principles of 
statutory construction which require that due effect and harmony 
be given, if at all possible, to all statutory provisions. 
(Appellee"s Brief, at 8-9). 
While statutory harmony may be an elusive goal with some 
legislation, Mr. Derbidge contends that there is no difficulty 
with this statute when construed according to his interpretation, 
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which affords the additional advantage of "harmony," rather than 
dissonance, with the Common Law of Utah. 
MPIC further suggests that there is no basis for a 
distinction between a "knowing" misrepresentation and one that is 
"fraudulent." (Appellee"s Brief, at 9, note 2). 
In fact, the statutory history (See Appellee's Brief, at 9, 
note 3) shows that the prior statute provided for rescission 
relief for misrepresentation that was "fraudulent." (U.C.A. 31-
19-8 (repealed 1986). The new statute, U.C.A. 31A-21-105(2), 
substituted the phrase "intent to deceive" for the same effect. 
The point is that the level of knowledge required for "intent to 
deceive" may be interchangeable with "fraud," but not necessarily 
with that required for a knowing misstatement, or 
"misrepresentation." 
The effect of MPIC's assertion would be that there would be 
no difference between a simple error of fact and one made with 
knowledge of the true condition. Knowledge, however, does not 
necessarily include fraud, or intent to deceive. An applicant 
may have known of a condition or occurrence, but have forgotten, 
as is often innocently the case when someone tries to reconstruct 
a health history over a period of several years. Or, he may 
assume that a condition would be considered as "de minimis," as 
is often actually the case. Nevertheless, a misstatement, on the 
basis of such knowledge, could be considered a misrepresentation. 
However, when the applicant has no knowledge, no knowledge at 
all, the Utah Courts have always held that statements made on 
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that basis, or lack thereof, do not constitute misrepresentation. 
(Appellant's Brief, at 13-14). 
The distinction between these levels of knowledge is 
emphasized in MPIC's own policy, in the language reflective of 
statutory provisions which govern contestability of the contract. 
Part K(2) of the policy (Record, at 50-51; Appellee's Brief, at 
3-4) provides that after two years from the policy date only 
fraudulent misstatements may be the basis for rescission, but not 
other misstatements, even though knowledgeably made, which do not 
rise to the level of fraud, or intent to deceive. 
U.C.A. 31A-21-105 can meaningfully accommodate, without 
redundancy, the long-standing interpretation of Utah Courts that 
only knowledgeable misstatements constitute misrepresentation. 
Construction of Statutes at variance with Common Law 
One of the classic rules of statutory interpretation is that 
provisions in derogation of the Common Law are strictly 
construed. This was cited by Appellant (Appellant's Brief, at 
12) and acknowledged by the Court below. (Record, at 159). 
Appellee correctly points to an old provision of the Utah Code, 
U.C.A. 68-3-2, (Appellee's Brief, at 10) which states that this 
rule of construction will not apply in Utah, and that all 
statutes will be liberally construed to effect their intent and 
to promote justice. This provision has been acknowledged by the 
Utah Supreme Court, both in the breach, and the observance. 
Nevertheless, the Utah Courts still retain the obligation to 
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interpret the statutory provisions of the Legislature. When a 
statute is clearly drafted, it may be liberally construed to 
effect its intent. If ambiguous, the statute must be interpreted 
carefully, perhaps strictly, to effect its application. In 
interpreting then-section 2489, Comp. Laws 1907, the Supreme 
Court offered this comment: 
In arriving at the true meaning of a particular 
section, it is not only permissible, but very often necessary, 
that all the provisions of the act of which the particular 
section forms a part be considered, as well as the object or 
purpose of the lawmaking power in adopting the entire act as 
passed. True it is that the language employed by the Legislature 
must first be considered, and, if this is unambiguous and direct, 
it must ordinarily be given full force and effect. When, 
therefore, a forfeiture of a pre-existing right is claimed by 
reason that a particular clause or section of an entire act has 
not been literally complied with, and when the statute does not 
in terms or by unavoidable implication declare that the failure 
of a strict compliance shall work a forfeiture, the courts may 
well pause before declaring a forfeiture by reason that all the 
provisions of the act have not been literally complied with. 
(Pool v. Utah County Light & Power Co., — Utah — , 105 P. 289, 
291, (1909)) 
Whether the statute is construed strictly or broadly is 
perhaps only of semantic importance for this case. The purpose 
of the statute is to protect the public from overreaching 
insurers and the business of insurance from dishonest applicants. 
This regulation was first attempted by the Courts and later by 
the Legislature, for the same purpose. In this case, where the 
definition of misrepresentation was settled in the Common Law of 
Utah (Appellant's Brief, at 10-12) and not specifically changed 
by the statute, it would not diminish the full effect of the 
legislation to retain the earlier definition in the 
interpretation of the statute. In addition, it is a tenet of the 
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law that forfeiture of insurance is to be avoided, if possible. 
Accordingly, in order to effect a rescission on the basis of a 
misstatement, or misrepresentation, in the application for 
insurance, the insurer would need to adduce evidence that the 
misrepresentation was knowledgeably made by the applicant. This 
is a reasonable interpretation, protective of both the public and 
the insurers, and avoids unnecessary rescission, or forfeiture, 
of insurance coverage. While the minority view, it is the law of 
several other jurisdictions, including California, Idaho, and 
Colorado. (Record, at 99). 
Terms -rx the application 
The terms of the policy include both the wording of the 
application, insuring provisions, and the standard provisions 
required by law, which include such terms as limitations on the 
period of contestability. To the extent that they are in 
conflict, the insured should be entitled to the provisions of the 
contract. The language governing contestability is a minimum 
standard, provided by the Legislature for the protection of the 
public. If an insurer decided to abbreviate the contestable 
period to one year, or to six months, or to forgo it altogether, 
it could do so. If it wanted to hold the applicant only to 
statements made with knowledge, it could also do that. 
Mr. Derbidge maintains that this is what MPIC has, in fact, 
done. Mrs. Seymour was asked to respond in the application only 
to "the best of her knowledge." (Record, at 29, No. 10; 
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Appellant's Brief, Addendum 3, No. 10). Accepted rules of 
contract construction provide that provisions of coverage in 
insurance contracts be broadly construed in favor of the insured 
and terms of exclusion be given a narrow interpretation, for the 
same purpose of protecting the public from insurer misconduct. 
Either way, with respect to ambiguous provisions, the insured 
receives the benefit of the doubt. (Record, at 100; Bergera v. 
Ideal National Life Insurance Co., 524 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 
1974)) . 
In this case, in determining whether the reference to 
knowledge is a material and beneficial provision of the contract, 
or only a provision of "certification," as MPIC asserts, 
(Appellee's Brief, at 12) the applicant is entitled to receive a 
broad interpretation, the benefit of the doubt, and to receive 
the advantage of the face value of the terms of the agreement. 
If the contract said that the applicant should answer only to the 
best of her knowledge, that should be what it means. Since Mrs. 
Seymour complied with the provisions, she should have received 
the promised insurance protection. 
In drafting an agreement, the insurer does so at the peril 
of being held to its terms and the insuring public is fairly 
entitled to that protection. In this case, without evidence of 
knowledgeable misstatement, the insurer is obligated to extend 
the insurance benefit to which it agreed and on which the 
applicant relied. 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary Judgment should be allowed only when there is no 
issue of contested fact, (Appellant's Brief, at 4-5). In this 
case, the proper interpretation of the Insurance Code and the 
knowledge of Mrs. Seymour as she applied for the policy are 
salient points at issue. Mr. Derbidge should be entitled to 
present his case, and to have these issues determined at trial 
161TK 
Respectfully submitted this ( f day of August, 1997. 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
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